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Abstract
In year 2000, an efficient hierarchical chaotic image encryption (HCIE) algorithm was proposed, which divides a plain-image
of size M×N with T possible value levels into K blocks of the same size and then operates position permutation on two levels:
intra-block and inter-block. As a typical position permutation-only encryption algorithm, it has received intensive attention.
The present paper analyzes specific security performance of HCIE against ciphertext-only attack and known/chosen-plaintext
attack. It is found that only O(dlogT (M ·N/K)e) known/chosen plain-images are sufficient to achieve a good performance, and
the computational complexity is O(M · N · dlogT (M · N/K)e), which effectively demonstrates that hierarchical permutation-
only image encryption algorithms are less secure than normal (i.e., non-hierarchical) ones. Detailed experiment results are
given to verify the feasibility of the known-plaintext attack. In addition, it is pointed out that the security of HCIE against
ciphertext-only attack was much overestimated.
Keywords: Chosen-plaintext attack, chaotic cryptanalysis, known-plaintext attack, permutation.
1. Introduction
With the increasing transmission speeds of
wired/wireless networks and popularization of image
capturing devices and cloud storage services, image data
are transmitted over open networks more and more fre-
quently. This makes security of image data become more
and more important. The public concern of it becomes
serious as news about the illegal online leak of personal
photos of some celebrities was released. As a chaotic
system owns some similar properties as that of modern
encryption schemes, it has been intensively studied as an
alternative approach for designing secure and efficient
encryption schemes [1, 2, 3]. The main idea and principle
of applying chaos theory to protecting images can be
traced back to 1986 [4], which demonstrates the stretching
effect of a chaotic map on a painting of Henri Poincare´, a
founder of modern chaos theory.
The simplest and most efficient method for protecting
multimedia data is permuting the positions of their spa-
tial pixels [5] or frequency coefficients [6]. In the litera-
ture, some synonyms of permutation, transposition, shuffle,
scramble [6], swap and shift, are used. Security scrutiny
on some specific permutation-only encryption algorithms
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against known/chosen-plaintext attacks were previously de-
veloped [7, 8]. In [9], a ciphertext-only attack on a spe-
cially simple permutation-only encryption algorithm was
proposed utilizing correlation redundancy remaining in the
cipher-image. No matter how the permutation relation-
ships are generated and what the permutation object is, any
permutation-only encryption algorithm can always be rep-
resented by a permutation relationship matrix, whose entry
stores the corresponding permuted location in the cipher-
text [10]. The security of permutation-only encryption al-
gorithm relies on its real permutation domain, in which any
element in the permutation object can be permuted inde-
pendently. As for a permutation domain of size M × N
with T possible value levels, it is estimated that the re-
quired number of known/chosen-plaintexts for an efficient
plaintext attack is O(dlogT (M · N)e), where dxe denotes the
ceiling function. An upper bound of the attack complexity
is also derived therein to be O(n · (M · N)2), where n is the
number of known/chosen plain-images [10]. In [11], the
computational complexity of the attack is further reduced
to O(n · (M ·N)) by replacing the set intersection operations
of quadratic complexity with linear element access opera-
tions. Even so, all kinds of permutation operations are still
being used in multimedia protection today [12, 13, 14, 15].
In [16], a typical example of permutation-only image en-
cryption algorithms, called HCIE (hierarchical chaotic im-
age encryption), was proposed. Although security perfor-
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mance of general permutation-only image encryption algo-
rithms against plaintext attack has been quantitatively an-
alyzed, specific security performance of HCIE is still not
evaluated. The core of HCIE is a permutation function
composed of rotation operations of four directions, origi-
nates from an intellectual toy, Rubik’s Cube [17]. In [16],
the authors claimed about the security property of HCIE as
follows: “By way of collecting some original images and
their encryption results or collecting some specified images
and their corresponding encryption results, it is still diffi-
cult for the cryptanalysts to decrypt an encrypted image
correctly because the permutation relationship is different
for each image.” In this paper, we will demonstrate that the
claim on the robustness of HCIE against known/chosen-
plaintext attack is groundless. Further more, we find that
the hierarchical encryption structure suggested in HCIE
does not provide any higher security against known/chosen-
plaintext attack, but actually make the overall security even
weaker. In addition, we find the capability of HCIE against
ciphertext-only attack was much over-estimated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The algo-
rithm HCIE is briefly introduced in Sec. 2. Detailed crypt-
analysis on HCIE is provided in Sec. 3, with some experi-
mental results. The last section concludes the paper.
2. The hierarchical chaotic image encryption algorithm
(HCIE)
HCIE is a two-level hierarchical permutation-only image
encryption algorithm, in which all involved permutation
relationships are defined by pseudo-random combinations
of four rotation mappings with pseudo-random parameters.
For an image, f = [ f (i, j)]M×N , the four mapping opera-
tions are described as follows, where p < min(M,N) holds
for each mapping.
Definition 1. The mapping f ′ = ROLRi,pb ( f ) (0 ≤ i ≤ M −
1) is defined to rotate the i-th row of f , in the left (when
b = 0) or right (when b = 1) direction, by p pixels.
Definition 2. The mapping f ′ = ROUD j,pb ( f ) (0 ≤ j ≤
N − 1) is defined to rotate the j-th column of f , in the up
(when b = 0) or down (when b = 1) direction, by p pixels.
Definition 3. The mapping f ′ = ROURk,pb ( f ) (0 ≤ k ≤
M + N −2) is defined to rotate all pixels satisfying i + j = k,
in the lower-left (when b = 0) or upper-right (when b = 1)
direction, by p pixels.
Definition 4. The mapping f ′ = ROULl,pb ( f ) (1 − N ≤ l ≤
M − 1) is defined to rotate all pixels satisfying i − j = l,
in the upper-left (when b = 0) or lower-right (when b = 1)
direction, by p pixels.
Given a pseudo-random bit sequence {b(i)} starting from
i0, the Sub HCIE function in Algorithm 1 is used to permute
an S M × S N image fsub to become another S M × S N image
f ′sub, where (α, β, γ, no) are control parameters. One can see
Algorithm 1 The Sub HCIE function
1: function Sub HCIE( fsub, {b(i)}, no, S M , S N)
2: for ite← 0, no do
3: q← i0 + (3S M + 3S N − 2) · ite
4: p← α + β · b(q + 0) + γ · b(q + 1)
5: for i← 0, (S M − 1) do
6: f ′sub ← ROLRi,pb(i+q)( fsub)
7: end for
8: for j← 0, (S N − 1) do
9: f ′sub ← ROUD j,pb( j+q+S M )( f ′sub)
10: end for
11: for k ← 0, (S M + S N − 2) do
12: f ′sub ← ROURk,pb(k+q+S M+S N )( f ′sub)
13: end for
14: for l← (1 − S N), (S M − 1) do
15: f ′sub ← ROULl,pb(l+q+2·S M+3·S N−2)( f ′sub)
16: end for
17: end for
18: i0 ← i0 + (3S M + 3S N − 2) · no
19: return ( f ′sub, i0)
20: end function
that the Sub HCIE function actually defines an S M×S N per-
mutation relationship matrix pseudo-randomly controlled
by (3S M + 3S N − 2) · no bits in the bit sequence {b(i)}
from i0. Based on this function, for an M × N image
f = [ f (i, j)]M×N , the four basic parts of HCIE can be briefly
described as follows.
• The secret key is the initial condition x(0) and the con-
trol parameter µ of the chaotic Logistic map, f (x) =
µx(1 − x) [18], which is realized in L-bit finite preci-
sion.
• Some public parameters: S M , S N , α, β, γ and no,
where
√
M ≤ S M ≤ M, M mod S M = 0,
√
N ≤ S N ≤
N, and N mod S N = 0.
Note: Although (S M , S N , α, β, γ, no) can all be in-
cluded in the secret key, they are not suitable for such
a use due to the following reasons: 1) S M , S N are re-
lated to M,N; 2) α, β, γ are related to S M , S N (and
then related to M,N, too); 3) S M , S N can be easily
guessed from the mosaic effect of the cipher-image; 4)
iteration number no cannot be too large to achieve an
acceptable encryption speed.
• The initialization procedure of generating the bit se-
quence used in the Sub HCIE function: run the Lo-
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gistic map starting from x(0) to generate a chaotic se-
quence, {x(i)}dLb/8e−1i=0 , and then extract 8 bits following
the decimal point of each chaotic state x(i) to yield
a bit sequence {b(i)}Lb−1i=0 , where Lb =
(
1 + MS M · NS N
)
·
(3S M + 3S N − 2) · no; finally, set i0 = 0 to let the
Sub HCIE function run starting from b(0).
• The two-level hierarchical encryption procedure:
1) The high-level encryption – permuting image
blocks: divide the plain-image f into blocks of size
S M × S N , which compose an MS M × NS N block-image
P f =
[
P f (i, j)
]
M
S M
× NS N
,
where P f (i, j) is the block of size S M × S N at the po-
sition (i, j). Then, permute the positions of all blocks
with the Sub HCIE function in the following way: a)
create a pseudo-image fp = [ fp(i, j)]S M×S N contain-
ing
(
M
S M
· NS N
)
non-zero indices of all image blocks in
P f and
(
S M · S N − MS M · NS N
)
zero-elements, and per-
mute fp with the Sub HCIE function to get a shuf-
fled pseudo-image f ∗p ; b) generate a permuted block-
image P f ∗ from P f (i.e., permute f blockwise) using
the shuffled indices contained in f ∗p . The above high-
level encryption procedure can be considered as a per-
mutation of the block-image: P f
f ∗p =Sub HCIE( fp)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ P f ∗ ,
where f ∗p actually corresponds to an
M
S M
× NS N permu-
tation relationship matrix.
2) The low-level encryption – permuting pixels in ev-
ery image block one by one: for i = 0 ∼
(
M
S M
− 1
)
and
j = 0 ∼
(
N
S N
− 1
)
, call the Sub HCIE function to per-
mute each block P f ∗ (i, j) so as to get the correspond-
ing block of the cipher-image f ′:
P f ′ (i, j) = Sub HCIE
(
P f ∗ (i, j)
)
.
As normalized in [10], any permutation-only encryp-
tion algorithm exerting on an object of size H × W can be
represented with a permutation relationship matrix of size
H ×W, denoted by
W =
[
w(i, j) = (i′, j′) ∈ H ×W]H×W , (1)
where H = {0, · · · ,H − 1}, W = {0, · · · ,W − 1}, and
w(i1, j1) , w(i2, j2) for any (i1, j1) , (i2, j2).
In HCIE, a total of
(
1 + MS M · NS N
)
permutation relation-
ship matrices are involved: 1) one high-level permutation
relationship matrix of size MS M × NS N ; 2)
(
M
S M
· NS N
)
low-level
permutation relationship matrices of size S M×S N . With the
above-mentioned representation of a permutation-only im-
age encryption algorithm, the secret key (µ, x(0)) of HCIE
is equivalent to the
(
1 + MS M · NS N
)
permutation relationship
matrices for plain-images of the same size. To facilitate
the following discussions, we use W0 = [w0(i, j)] M
S M
× NS N
to denote the high-level permutation relationship matrix,
and use
{
W(i, j)
} M
S M
−1, NS N −1
i=0, j=0
to denote the
(
M
S M
× NS N
)
low-
level permutation relationship matrices, where W(i, j) =[
w(i, j)(i′, j′)
]
S M×S N . Apparently, the
(
1 + MS M · NS N
)
permu-
tation relationship matrices can be easily transformed to an
equivalent permutation relationship matrix of size M × N,
W = [w(i, j)]M×N .
When S M = M and S N = N (or S M = S N = 1), the
two hierarchical encryption levels merge into a single one;
the
(
1 + MS M · NS N
)
permutation relationship matrices become
one permutation relationship matrix of size M × N, a typi-
cal permutation-only image encryption algorithm in which
each pixel can be independently permuted to any other po-
sition in the whole image by a single M × N permutation
relationship matrixW.
3. Cryptanalysis of HCIE
3.1. Ciphertext-only attack
In [16], it was claimed that the complexity of brute-
force attacks to HCIE is O
(
2Lb
)
, since there are Lb =(
1 + MS M · NS N
)
· (3S M + 3S N − 2) · no secret chaotic bits in
{b(i)}Lb−1i=0 that are unknown to the attackers. However, this
statement is not true due to the following fact: the Lb bits
are uniquely determined by the secret key, i.e., the initial
condition x(0) and the control parameter µ, which have only
2L secret bits. This means that there are only 22L different
chaotic bit sequences.
Now, let us study the real complexity of brute-force at-
tacks. For each pair of guessed values of x(0) and µ, the
following operations are needed:
• generating the chaotic bit sequence: there are Lb/8
chaotic iterations;
• creating the pseudo-image fp: the complexity is S M ·
S N ;
• shuffling the pseudo-image fp: running the Sub HCIE
function once;
• generating P f ∗ : the complexity is M · N;
• shuffling the partition image P f ∗ : running the
Sub HCIE function for
(
M
S M
· NS N
)
times.
Assume that the computing complexity of the Sub HCIE
function is (4S M + 4S N) · no. Then, the total com-
plexity of brute-force attacks to HCIE can be estimated
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to be O
(
22L · (Lb + M · N)
)
, which is much smaller than
O
(
2Lb/8
)
when Lb is not too small. Additionally, consider-
ing the fact that the Logistic map can exhibit a sufficiently
strong chaotic behavior only when µ is close to 4 [19], the
above complexity should be even smaller. This analysis
shows that the security of HCIE was much over-estimated
by the authors in [20, 16], for brute-force attacks.
Observing the hierarchical permutation structure of
HCIE, one can see that the histogram of each S M×S N block
in the plain-image will keep unchanged during the whole
permutation process of HCIE. Due to the strong correla-
tion between neighbouring pixels (and even blocks) of nat-
ural images (See [21, Fig. 5]), there exists some correlation
between histograms of neighbouring blocks. So, one may
determine the relative locations of some blocks in cipher-
image by comparing similarity degrees of histograms for
every pair of cipher-blocks [22, 23].
3.2. The known-plaintext attack
Since HCIE is a permutation-only image encryption al-
gorithm, given n known plain-images f1 ∼ fn of size M×N
and the corresponding cipher-images f ′1 ∼ f ′n , one can sim-
ply call the Get Permutation Matrix function defined in
[10, Sec. 3.1] or its enhanced version in [11, Sec. 4] with
the input parameter ( f1 ∼ fn, f ′1 ∼ f ′n ,M,N) to estimate an
M × N permutation relationship matrixW, which is equiv-
alent to the
(
1 + MS M · NS N
)
smaller permutation relationship
matrices. However, if the hierarchical structure of HCIE is
considered, the known-plaintext attack may be quicker and
the estimation will be more effective. Thus, the following
hierarchical procedure of known-plaintext attacks to HCIE
is suggested1:
• Reconstruct the high-level permutation relationship
matrix W0: 1) for i = 0 ∼
(
M
S M
− 1
)
and j = 0 ∼(
N
S N
− 1
)
: calculate the mean values of the 2n blocks
P f1 (i, j) ∼ P fn (i, j), P f ′1 (i, j) ∼ P f ′n (i, j) and denote
them by P f1 (i, j) ∼ P fn (i, j) and P f ′1 (i, j) ∼ P f ′n (i, j);
2) generate 2n images P f1 ∼ P fn and P f ′1 ∼ P f ′n of size
M
S M
× NS N as follows: ∀m = 1 ∼ n,
P fm =
[
P fm (i, j)
]
M
S M
× NS N
(2)
and
P f ′m =
[
P f ′m (i, j)
]
M
S M
× NS N
, (3)
1For HCIE, the permutation relationship matrices also depend on the
values of the public parameters. To simplify the following description,
without loss of generality, it is assumed that all public parameters are fixed
for all known plain-images.
and call the Get Permutation Matrix function with
the input parameters(
P f1 ∼ P fn , P f ′1 ∼ P f ′n ,
M
S M
,
N
S N
)
to get an estimated permutation relationship ma-
trix W˜0 =
[
w˜0(i, j)
]
M
S M
× NS N
and its inverse W˜−10 =[
w˜−10 (i, j)
]
M
S M
× NS N
.
3) Reconstruct the
(
M
S M
· NS N
)
low-level permutation rela-
tionship matrices
{
W(i, j)
} M
S M
−1, NS N −1
i=0, j=0
:
• for i = 0 ∼
(
M
S M
− 1
)
and j = 0 ∼
(
N
S N
− 1
)
,
call the Get Permutation Matrix function with the
input parameters (P f1 (i, j) ∼ P fn (i, j), P f ′1 (i′, j′) ∼
P f ′n (i
′, j′), S M , S N), where (i′, j′) = W0(i, j), to de-
termine an estimated permutation relationship matrix
W˜(i, j) and its inverse W˜−1(i, j).
With the
(
1 + MS M · NS N
)
inverse matrices W−10 and{
W˜−1(i, j)
} M
S M
−1, NS N −1
i=0, j=0
, one can decrypt a new cipher-image f ′n+1
with Dermutation function given in Algorithm 2 to get an
estimated plain-image f ∗n+1:
Algorithm 2 The function Dermutation
1: function Dermutation(W−10 ,
{
W˜−1(i, j)
} M
S M
−1, NS N −1
i=0, j=0
, f ′n+1)
2: for i← 0, (M/S M) − 1 do
3: for j← 0, (N/S N) − 1 do
4: ftemp ← P f ′n+1 (w−10 (i, j))
5: for ii← 0, S M − 1 do
6: for j j← 0, S N − 1 do
7: f ∗temp(ii, j j)← ftemp
(
w−1(i, j)(ii, j j)
)
8: P f ∗n+1 (i, j)← f ∗temp
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
13: return f ∗n+1
14: end function
In fact, in the above procedure, any measure keeping in-
variant in the block permutations can be used instead of the
mean value. A typical measure is the histogram of each
S M × S N block. Although the mean value is less precise
than the histogram, it works well in most cases and is effec-
tive to reduce the time complexity. When T and S M × S N
are both very small, the efficiency of the mean value will
become low, in this case the histogram or the array of all
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pixel values can be used as a replacement. As for an image
of size H × W and T possible value levels, the number of
different histogram is
nh =
min(T, H·W)∑
i=1
(
T
i
)
·
(
H ·W
i − 1
)
. (4)
As nh is a huge number for a non-tiny image and histogram
is sensitive to the change of pixel value, it is easier to get
the high-level permutation relationship matrixW0 than the
low-level permutation relationship matrices.
Finally, let us see whether the hierarchical structure used
in HCIE is helpful for enhancing the security against the
known-plaintext attack to the common permutation image
ciphers. As discussed in [10, Sec. 3.1], n ≥ dlogT (2(M ·N−
1))e known plain-images are needed to achieve an accept-
able breaking performance. Since the hierarchical structure
makes it possible for an attacker to work on permutation
relationship matrices of size S M × S N or MS M × NS N (both
smaller than M × N), it is obvious that for HCIE the num-
ber of required known plain-images will be smaller than
dlogT (2(M · N − 1))e. As the permutation relationship ma-
trix W0 can be recovered in a very high probability with
one or two known plain-images, one can conclude as fol-
lows: the smaller the (S M × S N) is, the smaller the n is.
Also, the attack complexity will become lower, since the
number of used plaintexts is reduced. In this sense, hierar-
chical permutation-only image ciphers are less secure than
non-hierarchical ones, which discourages the use of HCIE.
3.3. Experimental results on known-plaintext attack
To verify the decryption performance of the above-
discussed known-plaintext attack to HCIE, some experi-
ments are performed using the six 256 × 256 test images
with 256 gray scales shown in Fig. 1. Assume that the first
n = 1 ∼ 5 test images are known to an attacker, the cipher-
image of the last test image is decrypted with the estimated
permutation relationship matrices, to evaluate the breaking
performance.
In the experiments, three different configurations of
HCIE are used: S M = S N = 256, S M = S N = 32,
S M = S N = 16. As mentioned above, the configuration
of S M = S N = 256 corresponds to general permutation-
only image ciphers working in the spatial domain (without
using hierarchical structures). As shown in [10, Sec. 4],
three known plain-images are always enough to achieve a
good breaking performance, and an almost perfect break-
ing performance can be achieved with four plain-images,
where the public parameters are α = 6, β = 3, γ = 3 and
no = 9.
Image #1 Image #2 Image #3
Image #4 Image #5 Image #6
Figure 1: The six 256 × 256 test images used in the experiments.
3.3.1. The experimental results with S M = S N = 32
The public parameters are set as follows: α = 4, β =
2, γ = 1 and no = 2. The cipher-images of the six test
images are all shown in Fig. 2. When the first n = 1 ∼
5 test images are known to the attacker, the obtained five
decrypted images of the sixth cipher-image are shown in
Fig. 3. As can be seen, one known plain-image cannot
reveal much useful visual information, but two is enough to
obtain a good performance.
Cipher-image #1 Cipher-image #2 Cipher-image #3
Cipher-image #4 Cipher-image #5 Cipher-image #6
Figure 2: The cipher-images of the six 256× 256 test images, when S M =
S N = 32.
3.3.2. The experimental results with S M = S N = 16
The public parameters are α = 4, β = 2, γ = 1 and
no = 2. The cipher-images of the six test images are all
shown in Fig. 4. When the first n = 1 ∼ 5 test images
are known to the attacker, the five decrypt images of the
sixth cipher-image are shown in Fig. 5. As can be seen,
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n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
n = 4 n = 5
Figure 3: The decrypted image of Cipher-Image #6 when the first n test
images are known to the attacker, when S M = S N = 32.
even one known plain-image can reveal a rough view of the
plain-image, and two is enough to obtain a nearly-perfect
recovery.
Cipher-image #1 Cipher-image #2 Cipher-image #3
Cipher-image #4 Cipher-image #5 Cipher-image #6
Figure 4: The cipher-images of the six 256× 256 test images, when S M =
S N = 16.
Now, let us give a performance comparison of the
known-plaintext attack to HCIE with the above three dif-
ferent configurations. Figure 6a) shows the quantitative re-
lationship between the number of known plain-images and
the decryption quality (represented by the decryption error
ratio). It can be seen that three known plain-images are
enough for all three configurations to achieve an acceptable
breaking performance, and two can reveal quite a lot of pix-
els (which means that most significant visual information is
revealed). Also, it is found that the breaking performance
is dependent on the configuration: when S M = S N = 16,
the best performance is achieved, which coincides with the
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
n = 4 n = 5
Figure 5: The decrypted images of Cipher-Image #6 when the first n test
images are known to an attacker, when S M = S N = 16.
previous analysis.
Figure 6b) shows the average cardinality of the elements
in Ŵ, which is an indicator of the probability of getting cor-
rect permutation elements in W˜ and an indicator of the time
complexity as analyzed above. Comparing Figures 6a) and
6b), one can see that the occurrence probability of decryp-
tion errors has a good correspondence with the average car-
dinality, where the correctness of the uniquely-determined
permutation relationship matrix was obtained by some cho-
sen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images.
From the above comparison, it is concluded that the se-
curity of HCIE with a hierarchical structure is even weaker
than the security of general permutation-only image en-
cryption algorithms without hierarchical structures: when
S M = S N = 32 and S M = S N = 16, two known plain-
images are enough to achieve an acceptable breaking per-
formance; while when S M = S N = 256, the breaking per-
formance with two known plain-images is not satisfactory,
thus three plain-images are needed to achieve an accept-
able performance. Overall, from the viewpoint of secu-
rity against known/chosen-plaintext attacks, the hierarchi-
cal idea proposed in HCIE has no technical merits.
3.4. Chosen-plaintext attack
To discover an equivalent secret key of a common
permutation-only image encryption scheme under the sce-
nario of chosen-plaintext attack, one can construct a “com-
position plain-text”, whose every element is different from
each other [24, Sec. 5.1]. To satisfy the requirement, the
number of the bit planes of the special chosen-text should
be not smaller than dlog2(M · N)e. So, the number of re-
quired chosen-images is
n = ddlog2(M · N)e/dlog2(T )ee.
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1 2 3 4 5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
n
a) decryption error ratio
1 2 3 4 5
100
101
102
103
n
b) the average cardinality #(ŵ(i, j))
(Legend: 4 – S M = S N = 256,  – S M = S N = 32, © –
S M = S N = 16)
Figure 6: A performance comparison of the known-plaintext attack to
HCIE.
In general, T is a power of 2 in the digital domain, hence
log2(T ) is an integer. To this end, one has
n = dlog2(M · N)/ log2(T )e = dlogT (M · N)e (5)
by referring to [25, Theorem 3.10].
Similarly to the known-plaintext attack, the use of a hier-
archical structure in HCIE can also make the construction
of chosen plain-images easier. Accordingly, an attacker
can work hierarchically to construct n chosen plain-images,
f1, · · · , fn, as follows:
• high-level: P f1 ∼ P fn , which are defined in Eq. (2),
compose an orthogonal image set;
• low-level: ∀(i, j), P f1 (i, j) ∼ P fn (i, j) compose an or-
thogonal image set.
In this case, the minimal number of required chosen plain-
images becomes
n = max
(⌈
logT (S M · S N)
⌉
,
⌈
logT (K)
⌉)
≤ ⌈logT (M · N)⌉ , (6)
where K = MS M · NS N . The above equality holds if and only if
the hierarchical encryption structure is disabled, i.e., when
K ∈ {1,M · N}.
As the
(
1 + MS M · NS N
)
permutation relationship matrices
of HCIE are uniquely determined by the bit sequence
{b(i)}Lb−1i=0 and the public parameters, one may recover re-
versely some consecutive bits of {b(i)}Lb−1i=0 [26, Sec. 3.3.6].
Furthermore, one can derive the secret key x(0) and µ fol-
lowing the approach given in [21, Sec.3.3.2].
4. Conclusion
Specific security performance of a typical permutation-
only encryption algorithm, called HCIE, against ciphertext-
only attack and known/chosen-plaintext attacks has been
studied in detail. It is found that the capability of HCIE
against the former attack was over-estimated much and hi-
erarchical permutation-only image encryption algorithms
such as HCIE are less secure than normal permutation-only
ones without using hierarchical encryption structures. This
work effectively demonstrates that the size of the real per-
mutation domain of a permutation algorithm should be as
large as possible in order to reach the best performance. As
permutation operation alone cannot provide high level of
security, it should be combined with other value substitu-
tion functions.
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